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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

1.

Facts

On his way to work at about 7:08 A.M., July 20, 2007 respondent, ("the driver") rear-ended
another North-bound motorist as both were waiting for a green left-tum signal from Broadway
turning West onto Front Street, Boise, Idaho. No significant damage occurred; there were no
injuries.
The driver had slurred speech, appeared sleepy, and acknowledged taking multiple
medications. Under leading examination by the officer initially responding to the scene, he
acknowledged he had taken Ambien at about 1:00 AM. Stipulated Record Supplement, Track 1,
1:47 - 2:15. He mentioned other specified prescription medications, including lithium, but was
not specific as to time, place or context in which they were or were not consumed. Stipulate
Record Supplement, Track 2, 47:45-end. Based on failure of the field sobriety tests and the
totality of circumstances, he was processed for DUI and arrested. Administrative Record for
Judicial review, Pages 5, 28 (AR 5, 28); Reporter's Transcript Page 14, Lines 18-19 (RT 14:18),
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, Paragraphs II and IX (FFCLO 1, 3; AR
28, 30).
The driver cooperated with his processing officer, took a breath test showing no trace of
alcohol, AR 2, and submitted also to a urine test. AR 4, RT 14-15. He ultimately plead guilty to
an infraction, following too closely. AR 24.
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Months later, a report of the State Laboratory, AR 9-10, was received by the appellant
Idaho Department of Transportation ("department"). That report detected only the presence of
Fluoxetine (Prozac), noting further it was prescribed, but opining nothing about its concentration
nor its effect (if any) upon intoxication, impairment or other relationship to the activities of
driving. The department timely initiated this proceeding. ARI l.

2.

Administrative Proceeding

The driver requested a hearing which was held November 27, 2007 before Michael
Howell, Esq. sitting as designated hearing examiner ("examiner") for the department. The driver
presented facts about the two medications mentioned to the officer, AR 4, plus two more still in
his medicine cabinet, RT 9-13, which all contained warnings against mixing with alcohol (e.g.,
RT 10:10-13; RT 11 :8-11) or using without knowledge of their effects. Citation infra. The
driver corroborated the negative alcohol BAC test by testifying he consumed no alcohol. He
testified he had not experienced any problems with impairment from any of them, nor from
combinations in the past. RT 15:7-8, 16:23-17:l. The Prozac, in particular, he had been using
for three years. RT 14:22-3. Loring Beals, a toxicologist, testified that long-term use of most
medications increased tolerance and therefore diminishes their effect on the person. RT 19:9-15.
There was no evidence linking impairment to any drug, except the officer's disputed affidavit
stating that the driver "had knowledge he was not to operate a motor vehicle while taking these
medications." 1

1

The audiotape of defendant's initial officer contact was admitted into evidence at the administrative hearing. It is
stipulated to be part of this record. The relevant portions are at Disc 1, Track 1, 1:47 -2:15 and Track 2, 4:20 -5:00
mentioning Ambien; and 47:45 adding lithium. The drug whose presence was actually detected in the urine test.
Prozac-was apparently never mentioned in any conversation. One of the officers opined that the driver's feelings
of drowsiness were "entirely normal." 48:55-50:18. The driver's statements in these areas of the audiotape are for
the most part unintelligible, possibly explaining why no direct findings of fact were made as to their content.
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Tue toxicologist did present unrebutted testimony on this matter. Tue urine test showed
only that the driver had taken Prozac at some time in the past, RT 21:18-25. That fact alone
could not support any inference of impairment. 22:1-13; 23:2-8. This expert witness also
underscored the label warnings' language that driving was not a prohibited activity for users of
Prozac, but that users should be familiar with their effects before operating machinery. RT
20:12-16. When asked if the urine test results show anything wrong with a person's driving or
ability to operate a vehicle, Mr. Beals' unequivocal answer was "No." RT 23:16. Further, there
could have been anything from massive to trace amounts of Prozac in the system of the driver,
but this qualitative urine test could be neither "passed" nor "failed." RT 23:9-24:17.

3. Reversal by the District Court
The examiner upheld the suspension. (Clerk's Exh. I, Admin. R. at 030). The driver
timely appealed this decision. A briefed and argued district court proceeding was held before
Hon. D. Duff McKee. He reversed the agency's action. (Clerk's R. at 00042-00050). Tue
parties to this appeal have requested the court supplement the record with true copies of the
audiotapes that were made part of the hearing record, which may or may not have been before
Judge McKee.

B.

Standard of Review.

"Idaho Code § 18-8002A(8) authorizes judicial review of a hearing officer's decision on
an administrative license suspension in the manner provided for judicial review of final
agency actions under the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 52, title 67, Idaho
Code. Upon such judicial review, the hearing officer's decision must be affirmed
unless the court finds that the hearing officer's findings or conclusions are:
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(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.
LC. § 67-5279(3)."

State v. Kane; 139 Idaho 586, 589-90, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003). The driver here, as
appellant below, therefore bore a heavy burden. However, it was not necessary to show
administrative error in every prong of Subsection (3) of§ 5279. The law is phrased in the
alternative: As appellant did here to the satisfaction of Judge McKee, it may be shown that
administrative decisions are not supported by substantial evidence, that they are inconsistent with
procedural law or statutory authority, or that they are arbitrary, capricious or indiscrete.
The Administrative License Suspension (ALS) process was enacted by the Idaho
Legislature to provide a remedial supplement to its aggressive enforcement of criminal laws
against driving under the influence. Other cases before and after Kane give identical instructions
to reviewing courts:
"The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's
license. See LC. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In an appeal from the
decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this Court
reviews the agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v.
Idaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002). This
Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. of Comm's, 134
Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
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A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions;
(b) exceed the agency's statutory authority;
(c) are made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or
(e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3).
The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred
in a manner specified in LC.§ 67-5279(3) ... (non-ALS citations omitted.]."
State v. Talavera; 127 Idaho 700, 905 P.2d 633 (1995) [Emphasis added.]. See also Matter of
Driver's License ofArcher, Docket No. 33725, Court of Appeals of Idaho (2008).

II.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Do contested hearings under Idaho Code § 18-8002A have a different,

causation-based adjudicative standard for evidentiary drug tests than for alcohol tests?
2.

Did the district court correctly conclude that circumstantial evidence alone

failed to show the required causal connection between the drug test results and a violation
ofldaho Code§ 18-8004(a)?

III.
ARGUMENT
A.

Introduction

Appellant is correct that the ALS program is remedial in nature, that there is ample
legislative history to support construing its laws in favor of its salutary purposes, and that the
burden of providing substantial evidence rests upon him. In re Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 24
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P.3d at 868, State v. Reichenberg, 128 Idaho 452, 915 P.2d 14 (1996). However, to state that
"The district court effectively shifted the burden in license suspension matters from the driver to
the Idaho Transportation Department" mischaracterizes the record.
This wild statement appears to flow from a single, repeated procedural conflation, found
throughout the department's brief. Over and over again arguments fail to distinguish the
bifurcated, two-stage process of the ALS program:
1)

The probable cause affidavit and the automatic suspension that follows, absent a
hearing request2; and

2)

The adjudicative phase involved in this case. § 18-8002A(7).

This case is about the contested case hearing phase only.
B.

Under§ 18-8002A a Seized License Must be Returned on Substantial
Evidence that Drug(s) were Not Intoxicating

Reisenauer v. State Department of Transportation, 145 Idaho 948,951, 188 P.3d 890,
893 (2008) is the controlling case for this controversy. It discusses why urine tests should
require more scrutiny than they received in the examiner's decision, and explain why Judge
McKee reversed that decision. In its first part, Reisenauer rejected the state's appeal by simply
holding that no showing had been made that the Carboxy-THC metabolite was a drug. At that
point its holding could have been limited. Surely the state will argue that everything thereafter
was dictum. However, Reisenauer, 188 P.3d p. 892, states:
2 Kane describes the first stage like this: "If an evidentia,y test of blood or urine was administered rather than a
breath test, the peace officer or the department shall serve the notice of suspension once the results are received.
The sworn statement required in this subsection shall be made on forms in accordance with rules adopted by the
department. Upon receipt of such documentation from a law enforcement officer, the /TD must suspend the
person's driver's license. I.e. § 18-8002A(4)(a)," [Emphasis added.]
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"The only issue, therefore, is whether the test results showed the presence of drugs or
other intoxicating substances." [Emphasis added.].
Therefore, the driver respectfully requests the court reaffirm Reisenauer's further discussion
about the meaning of the words "intoxicating" (in the various laws discussed). It is the key to this
case.
The district court held that the examiner was bound to consider all the evidence placed
before him in the evidentiary hearing, instead of simply relying upon the probable cause
affidavit. Had the examiner found some causal connection between the "failed" drug test, or the
drug Prozac itself and the driver's impairment, this case might be distinguishable frorn

Reisenauer. But the district court, like this court in Reisenhaur, discussed why the law requires
a nexus between any test disclosing a foreign substance and its influence on a driver. This
further discussion explained the clear statutory requirements of the ALS program: that before a
license can be taken away for failing a test, the test result itself must show a violation of§ 188004(a). It seems almost too obvious to belabor.
However, it is sometimes possible to ignore fine statutory definitions and directions in the
quest for zealous and expansive applications of state power. This case is apparently an effort to
re-argue against the clear direction of Reisenauer's second half- entitled "Application."
Reading Idaho Code §18-8002A, Subsection (4)(a) as was done by the examiner would
override any expert, personal or other evidence offered to rebut any blood or urine test -- from an
approved state laboratory- which disclosed the mere presence of "children's Tylenol," caffeine,
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or ibuprofen, an antidepressant, or perhaps even an herbal remedies like Echinacea known for its
medicinal properties. 3

But the law as actually written requires several things: an evidentiary test result, and the
additional clause after "presence or drugs or other intoxicating substances" says "in violation of
section 18-8004 ...." That plainly requires findings that the drug was not just called a drug, and
more than just that it was present: it must also be intoxicating. That is how a driver can violate
§18-8004. It's not the only way,4 but it's the only way a test result alone can show a violation,
which it must as § 18-8002A is presently written.

DUI prosecutions, subject to rules of evidence and "gatekeeping" (see "C" below), are
proper forums for proceedings involving drug impairment, as clear from Idaho Code§ 188004(3), and the numerous authorities ofldaho and other jurisdictions cited by the state. Many
drug-only DUI convictions have been upheld on facts nearly identical to the record in this case.
Appellant's brief is replete with them. For reasons set forth below, Idaho Code§ 188004A(4)(a) limits the inquiry to only whether a test is passed or failed.

4

5

Per se prosecutions, permitted in criminal practice, rely on legislative definition of particular levels of alcohol, and
no other substance. To depart from that clear legislative direction by permitting the ALS program to "make up"
substances and tests that it feels might be "passed" or "railed" to justify suspensions would range far beyond the
legislature's authority.
5
At the risk of repeating the discussion at fn.2 the driver here does not argue that drug test suspensions are always
improper, or that a test showing presence of a drug can never initiate an administrative action. Indeed, the failure of
appellant to distinguish the two stages of the ALS process leads to the confusion that somehow the ability to do so is
at stake here. This case is only about a contested hearing, and what was proper and improper given the quantum of
proof presented and the way it was handled. The department was fully entitled to begin proceedings. That process
then became a contested case, with substantial evidence showing no connection between drug presence and
intoxication.
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C. "Competent Evidence" can be a Vague Term, and Should be Construed and
Resolved in favor of the Driver, not the State
Defendant submits that the term "competent evidence" is at best ambiguous, if not vague.
Unrebutted toxicological testimony in this case established that urine tests in particular are
meaningless if used to prove impairment or intoxication. Besides providing attractive though
meaningless ''.junk science," they also conflict with more specific statutory levels of alcohol set
for urine as the legislature has set.

1.

Evidentiary Principles are Important

Without some gatekeeping, this branch of the ALS statute is unreliable on as applied. It
encourages administrative misuse of"scientific" evidence that actually proves nothing about
impairment or intoxication. It is not "competent" because it logically6 proves nothing about the
crime. Simply because that result might be statutorily admissible in court, as the product of the
state Jab, does not make it relevant to nor even connected to a violation of law.

The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that constitutional challenges to statutes' vagueness
may be either facial or as they may be applied to other persons or situations.. State v. Cobb et al;
132 Idaho 195 (1998, Fn.l).

A statute may be void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people of
ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it fails to establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute.
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 712, 69 P.2d at 132.
State v. Casano, 140 Idaho 461, 95 P.3d 79 (Ct. App. 2004).
6

See Judge McKee's discussiou of the logical fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc at Page 6 of his Memoraudum
Decision.
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When does a person's drug use become a violation of the DUI law? Most people assume
it occurs when there is competent evidence that such use caused impairment or was intoxicating.
This should be the plain meaning of"competent evidence," and it's how§ 18-8004(a) does in
fact work under the authorities cited by appellant. The driver here does not argue that he could
have been prosecuted criminally under§ 18-8004 and all surrounding circumstances of his
driving pattern, alleged admissions7 and appearance to the officer.
However, the way the ALS program and its enabling statute 8 actually work, every
chemical test that shows a urine sample tainted with any drug can properly, and indeed must,
trigger a proceeding to begin suspension. See discussion at fa.2, supra. 9 If drivers allow seven
days to elapse, that is that. No further inquiry is necessary. However, the mechanism for review
- when taken -- must be a meaningful test of officers' field suspicions. Mere presence of any
drug triggering automatic suspensions of operators' driving privileges cannot be applied as a
conclusive bar to substantial evidence that meets the drivers' burden of proof about whether the
drug in question was -- or was not - intoxicating.

2.

The Examiner Ignored the Most Probative, and Relied on the Least

The common legal definition of "competent" in the field of evidence applies to witnesses,
not their testimony. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 601 et seq. To stretch it to cover scientific
7

The officer's recollection that the driver "had knowledge that he was not to operate a motor vehicle while taking
these medications,'' problematic as mind-reading on its face, is argued to support that there was a causal connection
between the Prozac found in his urine and impairment. Even with citations of DUI cases sustaining convictions or
suspensions of licenses from other states, it is a very thin thread upon which to hang a claim that there is "substantial
evidence" in this record that it caused this driver's accident, behavior or other patterns that might well have
supported a criminal prosecution. In any event, the stipulated exhibits dispel the question, as no discussion of
Prozac occurs, and no admission by the driver as to any impairment caused by other drugs was made.
8
§ 18-8002A, not §18-8004(a)
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evidence like urine tests requires an even more strained reading of the rules of evidence, because
scientific evidence is covered by Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rules 701 et seq. and presupposes the
admitting foundation of expert witnesses. The ALS process, devoid of any further definition
about the nature of"competent evidence," creates at least a procedural or evidentiary ambiguity.
The term "competent evidence" as used in Idaho Code§ 8004(3), if imported from§ 188004(3) to give content to §18-8002A, either conflicts with the specific definitions of"test" in§
18-8004, or is ambiguous, requiring strict construction State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848,965
P., 2d 206, 208 (Ct.App.1988).

10

One way to resolve that is to require evaluation of good, well-

founded evidence over poor, if (as here) there is a choice. The expert here, without any rebuttal,
opined that the urine test proved nothing.
It is not necessary to construe statutes if their meaning is clear and unambiguous. The
reason the phrase "competent evidence'' is ambiguous is that specific levels of bodily fluid levels
of alcohol in urine have been set by the legislature. Other than alcohol levels, the Jaw leaves
open (very far open) the areas where "competent evidence" of a "test" may show violation of the
law prohibiting driving while under the influence of"drugs or other intoxicating substances."

IO "When a court must engage in statutory construction, its duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature, State v.
Shanks, 139 Idaho 152,154, 75 P.3d206, 208 (CtApp.2003). ln so doing, we look to the context of the statutol}' language in question
and the public policy behind the statute. Id.; State v. Cudd, 137 Idaho 625, 627, 51 P.3d 439, 441 (Ct.App.2002). When an ambiguous
statute is part of a larger statutory scheme, we not only focus upon the language of the ambiguous statute, but a1so look at other
statutes relating to the same subject matter and consider them together in order to discern legislative intent Shanks, 139 Idaho at 154,
75 P.3d at 208; State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 632, 51 P.3d 443,446 (Q.App.2002). Even when a statute is not ambiguous on its
face, 'Judicial construction might nevertheless be required to harmonize the statute with other legislative enactments on the same
subject" Winter v. State, 117 Idaho 103, 106, 785 P.2d 667,670 (CtApp.1989). We also are obligated to apply the doctrine of lenl(Y,
which requires courts to construe ambiguous criminal statutes in favor of the accused. State v. Wees, 138 Idaho 119, 124, 58 P.3d 103,
108 (CtApp.2002) [Emphasis added.]" Id at p. 848
The structure of the DU1 and ALS statutes clearly define the "test" [phrased in the singular] whose "failure" is subject to criminal prosecution
under both "per se" and «competent evidence" standards. Specific, numerical and chemical concentrations are provided for blood, breath and
urine - and only for alcohol, nothing else. The statute therefore provides no defined tests that can be passed or failed except for alcohol.
Expression unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another). See Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742,
749,682 P.2d 1289, 1296 (Ct App. 1984).
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Drug evidence is logically and legally connected (because the legislature says it is) to
intoxication or impairment. That is why initiating the proceeding in this matter was not wrong.
But the responsibility of the department did not stop there. It had to give the finding of probable
cause meaningful review. And that review had to fairly assess whether the test result in fact
measured or causally showed intoxication or impairment.
When the driver proffered unrebutted evidence here, and no other causal evidence
existed, the department's automatic suspension process should have yielded to the great weight
of that evidence before it and the decision should have vacated the suspension. Failure to do so
is merely to rubber-stamp the suspicions of a field officer, neglecting the critical fact-finding role
of the hearing process.
Exclusion of non-causal "scientific" evidence, otherwise admissible, is discussed in

Swallow v. Emergency Medicine ofIdaho; 138 Idaho 589, 67 P.3d 68 (2003), which held mere
coincidence is not "competent" to support the causation element of plaintiffs claim. See
discussion at fu.6 above. Without the connection of causation, expert testimony is simply
inadmissible, irrelevant and "not competent." Similar restrictions should be demanded of
material used by administrative tribunals, especially when their processes are automatically
triggered by any lab report showing "drugs."
Hearing examiners must be gatekeepers of 'junk science" and other material not logically
connected to violation of the law. That is their legal responsibility in the ALS suspension
context, because there is no other protection other than judicial review.
Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative force is outweighed by unfair
prejudice. Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 403. Competency (if applicable to evidence, as
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opposed to witnesses) also requires some gate keeping as to reliability. Comment to Idaho Rules
of Evidence, Rule 601 (1), pp. 2-3, State v. Iwakiri, 106 Idaho 671,682 P.2d 571 (1984). Had
the examiner in this case considered the unrebutted evidence of the toxicologist, he could not
have found that Petitioner "failed" his urine test simply because Prozac was present. His reliance
instead upon other facts apparent to the arresting officers did not discharge his responsibility to
determine passage or failure of the test - his statutory responsibility under Idaho Code § l 88002A.
"This Court reaffirms that the appropriate test for measuring the scientific reliability of
evidence is I.R.E. 702. (footnote omitted)". State v. Gleason; 123 Idaho 62 844 P.2d 691
(2002), discussing State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). The per se prong of

§18-8004 specifically quantifies certain concentrations of alcohol in breath, blood and urine as
per se violations oflaw, State v. Hardesty, 136 Idaho 707, 39 P.3d (Ct. App. 2002). Other
measurements of other substances, lacking that per se imprimatur of the legislature, must
therefore create only a rebuttable inference of influence or intoxication, not a conclusive fact.
The approach of the department would have reached the same result if Petitioner's urine
had contained children's Tylenol, caffeine and ibuprophen. Compare Reisenhaur. The concern
is not the nature of the drugs, but the absence of any causal connection between their mere
presence and the legal requirement that in order to violate 18-8004, a person must be under the
influence of such a substance, a combination of that and alcohol, or be intoxicated.
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D. Without Proof of Causation, Any Test Result Could Allow Suspension
As previously noted under "Standard of Review,'' courts may reverse administrative
decisions not supported by substantial evidence, or inconsistent with procedural law, inconsistent
with statutory authority, or whenever arbitrary, capricious or indiscrete.
The examiner's decision suffered from each of these to some extent. He essentially paid
exclusive attention to the affidavit of the arresting officer, and circumstantial evidence that
supported it, while ignoring overwhelming, contrary facts about the test submitted and
unrebutted in the hearing. 11 This was an abuse of discretion.
The children's Tylenol example of Reisenaur is particularly relevant here: There must
be evidence that a drug caused intoxication of a particular driver at a particular time because,
otherwise, license suspensions would be sustained after every traffic stop or accident where an
admission of prior drug use occurred and a person exhibited mere signs of disorientation. Such
circumstances, though less strong than failed field sobriety tests (FSTs) present here and in

Reisenaur, would be as grounded in law as those here. Such circumstantial evidence, instead of
causal proof, is fine and in accord with the statute's first stage, when a field officer finds
probable cause. It is not alone substantial evidence, which is the test of the examiner's work
here.

11

A particularly egregious example is noted in the state's brief, quoting a "mind reading" conclusion of the officer
that the driver "knew" he should not be driving "while taking these medications." Appellant's brief, P. 12, last line.
The audiotape before the examiner simply did not establish this conclusion, especially as to Prozac. To the extent
the driver's statements in that tape were about anything, they was about Ambien (and a little about lithium)-- not the
drug about whose presence the suspension was initiated, which was Prozac. Only the evidentiary test for Prozac
initiated the suspension proceedings, was before the examiner, and only its "influence" could be the basis for the
ALS suspension based on the arrest, the notice of suspension/seizure, and the ALS process whose suspension the
driver properly contested.
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If an examiner then reviews that probable cause, and discounts all evidence that the
disorientation (or failed FSTs) had nothing to do with the substance found in hls system -essentially the decision at the examiner level in thls case and in Reisenaur - that decision
would be essentially conclusive and unreviewable -- without the causation requirement held by
Judge McKee to be inherent in Idaho Code§ 18-8002A. Thls court is respectfully requested not
to hold that field sobriety tests are the sort of "evidentiary tests" that can be passed or failed to
sustain ALS suspensions. That is the same thin ice that the appellant was on in Reisenaur when
it argued that a non-drug (Carboly-THC) could be a "failed" test because of surrounding
circumstances, including failed FSTs.
Under the rule oflenity, criminal or penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of
the accused. State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 913 P.2d 1196 (1996); State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho_379,
380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1993). The forfeiture aspects of the civil ALS proceedings should
require such similar strict construction, or at least, adherence to principles of evidentiary
reliability.
Evidentiary principles discussed above protect doctors and other litigants from
unwarranted '1unk science." Even though administrative tribunals aren't bound by the rules of
evidence somewhere in the process drivers must have the opportunity to get the equivalent of
rational analysis review, oversight, and logical standards applicable to experts and witnesses who
claim to have special knowledge. The same adjudicative evil rejected in Swallow, supra -- that
foreign substances in bodily fluid are harmful- is presented by thls case. The court has power
and duty to review such "science," to require a showing of at least some nexus with the statutory
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element(s) of intoxication or impairment. Ifthere is none, the decisions based upon it depart
from the plain terms of the statute.

E. Drug Presence Without Connection to Impairment Conflicts with Other More
Specific Requirements of DUI Law
Idaho Code §18-8004(1) specifically provides that driving under the influence is a crime,
and that it can be either the result of alcohol at specified levels, or a combination of drugs and
alcohol. Though Idaho Code § 18-8004(2) enjoins prosecution of any person taking an approved
BAC test whose results are below .08 -- compare State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426, 913 P.2d 1196
(1996) -- Idaho Code §18-8004(3) qualifies that injunction by providing that a sub-.08 BAC like
defendant's does not bar prosecution if other "competent evidence" shows impairment or driving
under the influence. Its exact language says that the "competent evidence" must show a
violation of the statute itself, which means a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a). That
subsection contains the actual conduct prohibited. Such conduct is plainly being under the
influence of alcohol, drugs, intoxicating substances or a combination thereof.

§ 18-8004(a) goes on to specifically provide for levels of alcohol in blood, breath and

urine. These per se levels express the only legislative direction about what may be intoxicating
or impairing. § 18-8002A is more restrictive: it requires failure of an evidentiary test, 12 not just
general evidence tending to show, through circumstances or observed impairment that presence
of a drug or other substance and intoxication might have been related.

12

These are defmed in§ 18-8004 and are restricted to results ofD.L.E. -approved laboratories
and devices - - not general evidence.
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The legislature never defined "influence" or "intoxicating substances." However, it
specifically provided for blood, urine and breath levels of alcohol.

These levels there set were held to be elements of the crime itself. State v. Hardesty,
136 Idaho 707, 39 P.3d (Ct. App. 2002). Unless evidentiary tests are similarly specific, or at
least have some connection to the harm prohibited by the law (intoxication, impairment), using
them to forfeit drivers' licenses violates constitutional principles of fair notice about conduct
proscribed.

IV.

CONCLUSION
The suspicions of the officer triggering the suspension case were proper for initiating the
administrative process, but could not alone sustain the examiner's conclusion that Prozac
influenced the driver at the time he drove. The unrebutted record established that the urine test
itself, indicating a mere presence of drugs, did not logically or scientifically indicate impairment
or intoxication. The hearing examiner ignored this fact and the overwhelming weight of other
facts showing no connection between Prozac and the driving pattern of the driver.

The examiner abused his discretion and departed from the department's statutory
mandate. Only a test "failure" can trigger or sustain license suspension. The evidence before

him was clear that the drug test before him could be neither passed nor failed. Nevertheless he
created from whole cloth (i.e., bootstrapping the facts indicating probable cause to initiate the
proceeding) the conclusion that the evidentiary test itself was failed.
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Idaho Code §18-8002A is all about providing a civil penalty for failing an evidentiary
test. It is supposed to be sure, swift and predictable, with processes, procedures and substantive
requirements different from those of its criminal counterparts.
It plainly says the test results govern, not the driving pattern. Not the FST's, but the
evidentiary urine test and its result of "Prozac" that triggered the entire proceeding.
By this appeal the state seeks leave for its examiner to write their own suspension criteria.
That may be a zealous enforcement wish, but the law contains specific limits unless and until the
legislature enlarges the defini~"evidentiary tests."
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